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Abstract 
In this article we investigate the influence of family ownership on firm leverage across 
different sub-groups of family and non-family firms.  In addition, we examine the influence of 
firm size, geographical location and the 2008 global financial crisis on the capital structure of 
family firms. In both cases, we study the probability of firms using debt and, conditional on 
its use, the proportion of debt issued. We find that family ownership affects both decisions 
positively, namely when the firm is large or located in a metropolitan area. For small firms 
located outside metropolitan areas there is no clear family ownership effect.  We also find the 
2008 crisis had a substantial, but diversified, impact on family firm leverage.  On the one 
hand, all family firms were more prone to use debt after 2008; on the other, the proportion of 
debt held by levered family firms decreased for micro and small firms, but increased for large 
firms. Overall, the crisis effects on family firm leverage seem to be the result of both supply- 
and demand-side factors, with the former particularly affecting the availability of debt to 
micro and small firms. 
 
Keywords: family firms, capital structure, zero leverage, firm size, geographical location, 
financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Due to the great heterogeneity of firms with a family influence, there is no consensual 
definition of a family firm.1 However, irrespective of the definition adopted, it is clear that 
family firms are the most prevalent form of business organisation, with it being estimated that 
in most countries around the world between 70 and 95% of all firms are family-owned 
(European Family Businesses, 2012). Family firms employ 50–80% of the workforce in the 
private sector, contribute to non-governmental GDP between a minimum of 60% and a 
maximum of 90%, and 85% of all business start-ups are started with family money (European 
Family Businesses, 2012). Family firms are clearly important for economic growth (Carsrud 
and Cucculelli, 2014; Memili et al., 2015) and also for regional and local development 
(Basco, 2015; Block and Spiegel, 2013). 
Given their relevance, the ability of family firms to be successful is essential for economic 
development. Some suggest that family firms have unique characteristics which, in some 
circumstances, provide potential advantages over non-family firms in terms of performance 
and competitiveness (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Hoffmann et al., 2016), survival and 
longevity (Miller et al., 2008; Revilla et al., 2016), entrepreneurial activities (Aldrich and 
Cliff, 2003; Carsrud and Cucculelli, 2014) and output innovation (Duran et al., 2016; Matzler 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it seems that one of the main challenges faced by family 
businesses is access to funding (Michiels and Molly, 2017). As family firms are also often 
skeptical about the deployment of external funding (Croce and Martí, 2016; Koropp et al., 
2014), they may end up with a capital structure that is not the most appropriate for stimulating 
firm growth and sustainability. Therefore, an important research priority is to investigate 
family firm financing behaviour and whether it differs from that of non-family firms due to its 
specific characteristics.2 
There are many studies on the impact of family ownership on firm financing decisions, 
namely on their debt-equity mix. However, so far, the evidence provided is mixed, as the 
following examples illustrate: (i) Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) found that all-equity listed 
USA firms exhibit more extensive family involvement than levered firms. McConaughy et al. 
(2001) observed more conservative levels of debt in large family firms in the USA; (ii) 
Coleman and Carsky (1999) found virtually no differences between family-owned and non-
family-owned small US businesses in the usage of various credit products. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003b) reported that S&P 500 family firms use similar levels of debt to non-family 
firms; and (iii) King and Santor (2008) showed that Canadian publicly listed family firms 
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display higher financial leverage than their non-family counterparts.  Schmid (2013) found a 
similar result for several countries in East Asia and Western Europe. These conflicting 
findings may be due to a variety of reasons, such as the use of different definitions of family 
firms. The different economic and institutional contexts of the firms analysed in each study 
for example, different countries, different time frames, and the focus on particular groups of 
firms for example, small or large firms, are other possible explanations for divergent results.  
Thus, the findings described in the literature as universal for family firms may actually be 
valid only for specific family businesses in particular settings. 
Another limitation is that recent developments in the general capital structure literature 
have not yet been applied to family firm studies. For example, we are not aware of a single 
study focussing on family firms that allows the determinants of the probability of using debt 
to be different from those that explain the amount of debt issued (Cook et al., 2008; Ramalho 
and Silva, 2009). Moreover, the analysis of the capital structure decisions of family firms is 
never conditioned on the geographical location of firms inside a country (Arena and Dewally, 
2012; John et al., 2011). Finally, the so-called fractional regression models that take into 
account the proportional nature of the leverage ratios usually employed as dependent 
variables in capital structure econometric models (Chauhan and Huseynov, 2017; Ramalho 
and Silva, 2009, 2013) have never been applied in the context of family firms. 
The main aim of this article is to provide further insights into the effects of family 
ownership on capital structure and also, of firm size, geographical location and the 2008 
global financial crisis on the capital structure of family firms. Similarly to most previous 
studies, we use a single definition of family firm, considering a firm to be family-owned when 
one individual or a family owns at least 50% of the capital and at least one family member is 
present in the governing body. We also use data for a single country, Portugal, where family 
businesses account for 70% to 80% of the business sector, around two thirds of GNP and 50% 
of employment (European Commission, 2008). However, in order to overcome most of the 
limitations identified above, our approach differs from previous empirical studies on family 
business finance in a number of ways. 
The first major difference concerns the dataset used, which comprises family and non-
family firms of all sizes. The sample is partitioned into micro, small and large firms, which 
allows us to investigate whether the effect of family ownership on firm capital structure 
differs across these size-based groups of firms. As far as we know, this issue has not been 
directly investigated as most previous studies focused either on small (Basco, 2014; Memili et 
al., 2015) or large family firms (Keasey et al, 2015; Croci et al., 2011), which means that the 
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effects of family ownership and firm size on capital structure decisions may not have been 
properly disentangled yet. Indeed, family-owned firms have distinct characteristics and aims, 
such as overlapping roles between family membership and management (Dana and Smyrnos, 
2010; Revilla et al., 2016) and succession priorities (Helin and Jabri, 2016; Lefebvre and 
Lefebvre, 2016), differentiating them from non-family firms, irrespective of dimension. 
A second difference between this article and previous approaches is that we investigate 
the zero-leverage behaviour common to many firms but not studied in the literature on the 
financing decisions of family-owned firms. Some (Ramalho and Silva, 2009; Strebulaev and 
Yang, 2013) have recently argued that zero-leverage behaviour is a persistent phenomenon; as 
such, the factors determining whether a firm uses debt may be different from those that 
determine how much is actually used by firms who do use debt. We investigate whether zero-
leverage is also common behaviour in family-owned firms by estimating separately the 
influence of family ownership on both the participation - to use debt or not -  and amount - if 
using debt, how much to use -  decisions. 
There is some evidence in the financial literature that firm access to different financial 
options varies greatly depending on where the firm is located  in terms of urban or rural areas,  
and how far it is from a major metropolitan area (Arena and Dewally, 2012; John et al., 2011). 
Most of these analyses focus on small firms (Agostino et al., 2011; Iturralde et al., 2010), but 
we lack studies on the effect of firm location on family firm capital structure. This is 
somewhat surprising, since several papers discuss how location affects many other economic 
characteristics of family firms (Backman and Palmberg, 2015; Bird and Wennberg, 2014; 
Block and Spiegel, 2013).  Consequently, we use a sample comprising family and non-family 
firms from different regions and analyse whether the family ownership effect on financial 
leverage changes across different geographical locations, which is the third major contribution 
of this study. 
Because our sample relates to the period 2006-2012, covering pre- and post-crisis years, 
we are also able to examine how the recent global financial crisis affected the capital structure 
and financing decisions of family and non-family firms. There are several studies analysing 
the effects of financial crises on capital structure decisions, including the 2008 crisis (Cowling 
et al., 2012; Dang et al., 2014; McGuinness and Hogan, 2016; Van Hoang et al., 2017; 
Vermoesen et al., 2013), but, to the best of our knowledge, only a few focused on the impact 
of this recent crisis on the financing decisions of family firms (Arrondo-García et al., 2016; 
Crespí and Martín-Oliver, 2015; D'Aurizio et al., 2015). Thus, providing further evidence on 
how family and non-family firm access to funding changed during the recent global financial 
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crisis is our fourth major contribution. Given that Portugal was one of the countries in the 
European Union most affected by the recent global financial crisis, with a severe impact upon 
the banking sector, the main provider of external funds for Portuguese non-financial firms, 
our data is appropriate for such an analysis. 
Our final major contribution concerns the econometric methodology employed. We use 
random-effects binary choice models (Wooldridge, 2010) to explain the probability of a firm 
using debt and linearized random-effects fractional regression models (Ramalho et al., 2017) 
to explain the proportion of debt held by levered firms. This econometric methodology suits 
the panel structure of the data and, unlike linear regression models, takes into account the 
bounded, proportional nature of the leverage ratio we use in the fractional regression models 
as dependent variable. While ‘two-part’ (binary + fractional) regression models have already 
been used in the capital structure literature (Cook et al., 2008; Ramalho and Silva, 2009), to 
our knowledge, this is their first application in a panel data context and to family firms. 
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 applies the most common capital structure 
theories to the specific context of family-owned firms and formulates the empirical 
hypotheses about their financing behaviour. Section 3 describes the sample and performs a 
preliminary analysis of the impact of family ownership on financial leverage. Section 4 
discusses the econometric methodology used and presents the main empirical results obtained. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Family Ownership and Capital Structure: Theory and Empirical Hypotheses 
 
Throughout this section, accompanying the theoretical discussion, we present a number of 
empirical hypotheses. Some of those hypotheses concern the behaviour of family and non-
family firms, representing conjectures about the influence of the family ownership factor on 
firm capital structure, both in general terms and for particular groups of firms. The other 
empirical hypotheses focus on the effects of firm size, zero-debt policies, geographical 
location and the 2008 crisis on the financial leverage of family firms. 
 
2.1. The Classical Capital Structure Theories in the Context of Family Firms 
 
Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) is one of the most popular 
capital structure theories. According to this theory, firms tend to adopt a perfect hierarchical 
order of financing: first, they use internal resources and then, if external financing is required, 
they prefer debt to outside equity. In general, this behaviour is explained in terms of 
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information asymmetries between managers and potential outside financiers, which limit 
access to external finance. In the context of family businesses, the same reasoning obviously 
applies and, in fact, it has been found that for these firms, due to greater potential for 
expropriation, the cost of external finance is more sensitive to informational opacity (Chen et 
al., 2014; Ma et al., 2017). In addition, specific demand-side issues related to the 
characteristics of family businesses may be put forward to reinforce the importance of 
pecking-order theory in this particular framework. This occurs as one of the distinctive 
features of family firms is that managers are often owners; this suggests they have a greater 
ability to modify a firm’s asset portfolio to use benefits and channel funds to themselves, and 
the family (Ramalho and Silva, 2009; Roger and Schatt, 2016). Therefore, to preserve this 
situation, the financing decisions of owner-managers are frequently driven by the desire to 
minimise interference in their businesses and avoid the discipline inherent to the use of 
external funds (Koropp et al., 2014). Moreover, succession is one of the main concerns in 
family firms (Brenes et al., 2011). Thus, family firms tend to be more conservative and seek 
less external finance, even if that means the loss of growth opportunities, to prevent dilution 
of family control and avoid jeopardising future generations (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). 
Hence, retained earnings and personal savings are preferred financing sources and, if internal 
funds are required, debt is preferred to outside equity given lower levels of intrusion and 
erosion of control and decision-making power. 
Agency costs theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) states that the optimal capital structure 
of each firm depends on the value of debt that mitigates conflicts between stockholders and 
managers, on the one hand, and stockholders and debtholders, on the other. In the specific 
context of family firms, the former type of agency cost is expected to be minimal, since 
concentrated ownership and owner-management naturally aligns owner-manager interests 
concerning growth opportunities and risk. Therefore, the incentives to issue debt as a means 
of reducing the free cash at manager disposal are much less important for family firms. In 
contrast, that same close alignment of management and shareholder interests, and the 
consequent added flexibility of changing the asset base and greater opportunity to consume 
perquisites, exacerbates the debtholder-shareholder conflict in family firms. This arises from 
parental altruism and self-control problems (Schulze et al., 2001), implying higher monitoring 
costs. Hence, more stringent lending conditions, such as a higher interest rate (Lin et al., 
2011) or more collateral requirements (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009), may be imposed by 
lenders on family firms. Clearly, combining both types of agency costs, family firms are 
expected to use less external finance than their non-family counterparts. However, this 
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negative effect of family control on the use of debt may be attenuated by other characteristics 
of family firms and family shareholders such as undiversified portfolios, concern about firm 
and family reputation, longer investment horizons, and succession. If these are recognised by 
the lender, they may reduce monitoring costs and contribute to more favourable lending 
conditions. Indeed, debt holders may view family ownership as protective of their interests by 
ensuring continuity and stability. Crespí and Martín-Oliver (2015) provides evidence that 
family ownership is associated with greater availability of credit and Anderson et al. (2003) 
and Ma et al. (2017) find a lower cost of debt financing for family firms. 
Regarding trade-off theory, its central aspect is that firms set a target level for their debt-
equity ratio that balances the tax advantages of additional debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) 
against the costs of possible financial distress and bankruptcy originated by excessive debt 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). It is suggested that family firms use resources more 
efficiently (Lee, 2006; Maury, 2006), which may include the development of strategies based 
on debt usage aimed at reducing the tax burden. However, Chen et al. (2010) find that family 
firms are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. Moreover, the costs of 
insolvency tend to be higher for family firms because of the greater involvement of family 
owners in their businesses (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). Indeed, loss of self-esteem, self-
employment and personal assets are particularly relevant issues for family firms. Overall, 
trade-off theory suggests that ceteris paribus family firms may have a different optimal 
capital structure, but it is not clear whether the specificities of family firms will lead them to 
use more or less external finance. 
In this article, first, we are interested in investigating whether there is a relationship 
between family ownership and debt usage, irrespective of its sign. Based on the previous 
arguments, a positive, negative or no relationship are all plausible situations. There is no 
particular reason to think a priori that in Portugal some of the arguments make more sense 
than others. Thus, the first hypothesis that we test is generic and may be formulated as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: “Family ownership is a relevant factor in determining firm financing 
decisions.” 
 
Our second hypothesis is also generic and regards the stability of the relationship between 
family ownership and capital structure across different groups of firms. Most previous 
empirical studies on family firm capital structure focused on particular size-based groups of 
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firms. Moreover, they did not consider the recent global crisis, ignored the potential effects of 
the firm’s geographical location and treated levered and unlevered firms in a similar way.  As 
such, they were unable to separate the effects of all these factors on capital structure choices. 
In contrast, we allow the influence of family ownership to change across the four cited factors 
and test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: “The influence of family ownership on firm financing decisions is stable 
across: (a) micro/small/large firms; (b) levered/unlevered firms; (c) geographical 
locations; and (d) before/after the 2008 global financial crisis.” 
 
2.2. Firm Size and Zero Leverage 
 
Classical capital structure theories predict a positive relationship between debt usage and 
firm size. For instance, pecking-order theory predicts that larger firms find it easier to raise 
debt as informational asymmetries are less severe (Myers, 1984). Agency problems between 
managers and debt holders can be more serious due to the closely knit nature of small firms, 
implying greater monitoring costs (Michaelas et al., 1999). According to trade-off theory, as 
larger firms tend to be more diversified, their probability of bankruptcy is relatively lower 
(Warner, 1977). However, classical capital structure theories were originally developed for 
large, quoted companies. As argued by Scherr and Hulburt (2001), smaller firms are not 
simply larger firms scaled down: they differ, among other things, in taxability, flexibility, 
economies of scale, financial market access and ownership. Therefore, specific theories have 
been developed to explain the capital structure decisions of small firms. 
Most of the theories focusing on small firms are also based on asymmetric information 
(Berger and Udell, 1998) and agency cost (Michaelas et al., 1999) arguments, concluding that 
they are more serious in the context of small businesses. As a consequence, due to the 
aggravated cost and lower availability of credit, the greater reliance of small firms on internal 
funds and other sources of finance (loans from friends and relatives, credit cards, supplier 
credit, leases, customer financing) is deemed to be externally imposed (Fraser et al., 2015; 
Manolova et al., 2014). It has also been noted that the decision of smaller firms of using less 
external funds may be driven by choice rather than by necessity (Coleman et al., 2016). 
A problem with the literature on small business finance is that small firms are typically 
associated with family firms and therefore, the behaviour of the former is often explained 
using arguments that apply to the latter, but not to small non-family firms. Indeed, the family 
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ownership argument is commonly the main factor used to explain the aggravated agency 
problems of smaller firms (Michaelas et al., 1999) and small firm owner preference for 
internal finance (Ramalho and Silva, 2009). However, the majority of small firms are family 
businesses, but many have diverse ownership, as empirical studies using datasets comprising 
family and non-family small firms illustrate (Memili et al., 2015). Moreover, the proportion 
of large firms controlled by families is also relevant. For instance, Chen et al. (2014) report 
that 35.4% and 45.67% of the companies listed in the S&P 500 and S&P 1500 indices are 
family businesses. 
Similarly, it has been relatively common to explain the financial behaviour of family 
businesses using arguments that apply directly to small firms, but not to family firms. For 
instance, when the analysis is restricted to a sample of small firms, it is often argued that 
‘family firms have limited sources of external financial capital because (…) their size 
normally does not justify bond issues’ (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003, p. 343). However, this is a 
direct consequence of the dimension of the firm and not of its ownership, and so cannot be 
generalised to any type of family firm. Therefore, it is important to control for firm size to 
investigate what is the actual effect of family ownership on capital structure, as we do by 
allowing that effect to change across micro, small and large firms (see Hypothesis 2a above).  
It has been noted that the conjectured positive effect of firm size on leverage actually 
becomes negative when unlevered firms are excluded from the analysis. In particular, 
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007), Ramalho and Silva (2009) and Strebulaev and Yang (2013) 
found that while larger firms are more likely to have some debt, conditional on debt issuance, 
larger firms are typically less leveraged. Moreover, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) provided 
evidence that zero-leverage behaviour is an important and persistent phenomenon. Overall, 
these findings suggest that firm size may affect decisions on whether to issue debt and the 
amount of that debt in inverse ways: on the one hand, it influences positively the probability 
of a firm having debt; on the other, it negatively affects the relative amount of debt issued by 
levered firms. 
Clearly, none of the above capital structure theories can explain this double effect of firm 
size on leverage. In theoretical terms, a possible explanation based on the costs of external 
financing was outlined by Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007). First they argued that as smaller 
firms are more affected, in relative terms, by the existence of fixed costs in debt issuance, they 
opt more frequently for no leverage and have longer intervals between re-financing. This 
explains the positive effect of firm size on the debt participation decision. Second, smaller 
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firms choose higher leverage at the moment of refinancing to compensate for less frequent 
rebalancing, which explains the negative effect of firm size on the debt amount decision.  
Kurshev and Strebulaev’s (2007) ‘two-part theory’ relies exclusively on firm size: smaller 
firms are more affected by the existence of fixed costs in debt issuance. Because this is true 
irrespective of a firm being family-owned or not, we conjecture that the theory applies to all 
types of firms. Therefore, in addition to investigating whether the family ownership effect is 
stable across levered and unlevered firms (see Hypothesis 2b), we also test the following 
hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 3: “Firm size affects: (a) positively, the probability of family firms using debt; 
and (b) negatively, the proportion of debt issued by levered family firms.” 
 
2.3. Geographical Location 
 
It has been argued that capital structure may also depend on geographical location. 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) find that increasing distance between the borrower and 
alternative lenders significantly relaxes price competition and results in substantially higher 
borrowing costs for the firm. John et al. (2011) show that remotely located firms have higher 
information asymmetry levels for outside investors and, hence, a higher likelihood of pre-
committing to a higher proportion of debt and dividends to mitigate managerial agency 
conflicts. Arena and Dewally (2012) argue that firms in rural areas have a cost disadvantage 
in credit markets, facing higher debt yield spreads, but are more likely to rely on relationship 
banking, repeatedly borrowing from the same banks. In fact, relationship banking (Han et al., 
2017; Hasan et al., 2017) seems to be particularly important in less-urbanized areas, where 
interactions between loan officers and firm managers tend to be more frequent and fruitful, 
leading to the collection of better soft information. The main benefit of building close ties 
between firms and creditors is that the availability of financing increases (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994). 
There is also some evidence that geographical location affects family and non-family 
firms in distinct ways. According to Bird and Wennberg (2014) and Backman and Palmberg 
(2015), family firms generally appear to have strong local roots, being more locally embedded 
in the region due to their historical, social and cultural connections. Therefore, family firms 
are able to leverage personal relationships to a greater extent and establish more durable 
relationships with their regional communities.  This offers them a competitive advantage to 
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create, develop and allocate resources. This advantage is particularly important in rural 
regions, often characterised by resource scarcity and where, as discussed above, funding is 
often based on relationship banking. In contrast, in urban contexts, firms are more exposed to 
the anonymity of densely-populated areas and hence, their local connections tend to be much 
less important for their performance. Indeed, in this distinct social context, stakeholders tend 
to benefit firms that prioritise economic and market-oriented goals, irrespective of their 
relevance for the region. 
To the best of our knowledge, previous research has considered only the overall effect of 
geographical location on debt and has not distinguished between family and non-family firms. 
For example, considering both levered and unlevered firms, Arena and Dewally (2012) found 
that firms in small cities carry longer term debt than in more densely populated areas, while 
John et al.,  (2011) found that a central location has a negative relation with total, and long-
term, leverage. In addition to testing whether leverage between family and non-family firms 
differs across geographical locations (see Hypothesis 2c), we conjecture that geographical 
location may influence family firms differently regarding the probability of using debt, and 
the amount of debt issued. In particular, we hypothesise that the relationship banking that 
seems to be more favourable to firms located in non-metropolitan areas will significantly 
increase the likelihood of family firms using debt by partially compensating for their higher 
informational opacity. However, because the increased use of soft information is not expected 
to substantially reduce the higher debt yield spreads expected in non-metropolitan areas, we 
conjecture that levered family firms in metropolitan areas hold a higher proportion of debt in 
their capital structure. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: “Relative to firms located in less urbanised areas, family firms in densely 
populated areas: (a) are less prone to use debt; and (b) conditional on having debt, use it in 
a higher proportion.” 
 
2.4. The Global Financial Crisis 
 
There is a substantial literature on the economic consequences of financial crises. In 
general, any financial crisis reduces the capacity of firms to self-finance and access to bank 
credit and new equity (Lemmon and Roberts, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011), often 
leading to debt crises (Levy-Yeyate and Panniza, 2011; Furceri and Zdzienicka, 2012). 
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The 2008 U.S. subprime crisis was transformed into a sovereign debt crisis in 2010 in 
several European countries, including Portugal, which had to apply for a bail-out programme 
in 2011. There are already various studies on the consequences of the crisis initiated in 2008 
on leverage decisions. Most suggest that small firms were particularly affected by the crisis. 
For example, Cowling et al. (2012) concluded that lending institutions appear to have used 
firm size as their primary lending criterion, with micro-business in particular being restricted 
regarding access to capital. Vermoesen et al. (2013) found that, in Belgium, the reduction in 
the credit supply originated by the global financial crisis had a greater impact on small firm 
investment due to their lower financing capacity.  Dang et al. (2014) presented evidence that 
this crisis had a greater impact on the financing policies of firms with more debt, less size and 
greater information asymmetry. Finally, Van Hoang et al. (2017) reported that the external 
leverage of French micro-enterprises was reduced during the crisis. 
The literature on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on family firm leverage is more 
sparse, with only two studies comparing the capital structure of family and non-family firms 
over the crisis period. Both D'Aurizio et al. (2015), for Italy, and Crespí and Martín-Oliver 
(2015), for Spain, found that credit to family firms contracted less sharply than that to non-
family firms. We test whether the family ownership effect on leverage remained stable over 
the crisis years, as conjectured in Hypothesis 2d. In addition, we posit that the global financial 
crisis may have had a double effect on family firm capital structure. Given the associated 
economic crisis, the internal resources generated by firms are expected to have diminished, 
which may have, for the first time, forced some to resort to debt. Conversely, the reduction in 
the credit supply originated by the global financial crisis is expected to have reduced the 
amount of debt held by firms, especially smaller firms. Thus, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: “The 2008 global financial crisis: (a) positively affected the probability of 
family firms using debt, especially in the case of small firms; and (b) decreased the 
proportion of debt used by levered family firms, especially in the case of small firms.” 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
The dataset was taken from the SABI database3, from which some information was 
extracted about balance sheets, income statements, shareholders and other characteristics of 
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Portuguese non-financial firms for the period 2006 to 2012. Firms with non-positive equity, 
sales or assets were discarded from the analysis as well as firms that were created in 2004 or 
later. Only firms without missing data for the whole seven year period were considered. The 
final sample contains 9220 firms and 64540 observations. 
There is no consensus in the empirical literature about how a family firm should be 
defined, but, typically, criteria related to firm management, ownership and/or control have 
been used; see González et al. (2013). The information available on SABI, which includes the 
types of shareholders, the names of each shareholder and respective number of shares held 
and the names of those on the board of directors and management of each firm, allows us to 
consider those three perspectives. Thus, we classify as a family firm all firms that meet the 
following three criteria: (i) are included by SABI in the shareholder category of ‘one or more 
known individuals or families’; (ii) the named individual or families control more than 50% 
of the capital; and (iii) the individual or at least one family member is on the board of 
directors or in management posts. As a result of this definition, our sample comprises 4752 
family firms and 4468 non-family firms. In the family firms, family members possess on 
average 88% of the capital and the average number of owners, managers and 
managers/owners is, respectively, 3.5, 3.7 and 1.4.  
To clarify the effect of the size factor on financial leverage, the sample was divided into 
three size-based groups (micro, small and large firms) according to the criteria defined by the 
European Commission (Recommendation 2003/361/EC), which was independently applied in 
each year.4 Thus, a firm was classified as micro (small) in each year if it reported a number of 
employees under 10 (50) and annual turnover or total assets no greater than 2 (10) million 
euros. Otherwise, it was classified as a large firm. In each year, our sample comprises 629 - 
1150 micro firms, 6400 - 6805 small firms and 1670 - 1824 large firms. Overall, 5958 
observations are relative to micro firms, 46219 to small firms and 12363 to large firms; see 
Table 1, which contains the breakdown of the sample by size and other factors. Most firms are 
classified as micro or small (80.8%), particularly in the case of family firms (88.0%). 
Nevertheless, around 32.1% of large firms are family-owned and about 43.9% of micro and 
small firms are classified as non-family firms, so this sample is sufficiently diversified to 
allow us to analyse the separate effects of family ownership and firm size on capital structure 
choices. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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To study the effect of geographical location on financial leverage, we partitioned the 
sample into two groups, classifying the firm as being in a metropolitan area or not. In 
particular, we consider as being located in a metropolitan area all firms in the functional 
regions of Lisbon and Oporto, which include not only the municipalities with the same names, 
but also their suburb municipalities that share a common market for labour, housing and 
household and company services. Similar definitions have been used in corporate finance 
studies using USA (Arena and Dewally, 2012; John et al., 2011), French (Boubaker et al, 
2015) or Swedish (Backman and Palmberg, 2015) data. Our sample comprises 3574 firms 
located in a metropolitan area (38.8%) and 5646 outside (61.2%). Non-family firms are 
predominant in the former area, while family firms are more common in the latter. 
The sample includes 27660 observations relative to the pre-crisis period (2006-2008) and 
36880 to the years 2009-2012. Given that firms in general display reasonably fast debt 
adjustments toward some target leverage5, the collected sample will also allow us to estimate 
the effects of the recent global financial crisis on financial leverage. Similar time spans for 
studying the effects on capital structure of this financial crisis were considered inter alia by 
Arrondo-García et al. (2016), 2006-2011, Dang et al. (2014), 2002-2012, McGuinness and 
Hogan (2016), 2003-2011, and Vermoesen et al. (2013), 2006-2009. 
As a summary measure of financing decisions, the ratio of long-term debt - debt with a 
maturity of more than one year - to long-term capital assets - defined as the sum of long-term 
debt and equity -  is used. This measure of leverage was chosen because we are interested in 
the firm’s active capital structure choices, while a non-trivial portion of short-term liabilities 
may simply reflect daily business arrangements rather than financial considerations. See 
Welch (2011) for an explanation of why the denominator of leverage ratios in capital structure 
studies should be the sum of financial debt and equity rather than total assets, and Anderson et 
al. (2003) and Schmid (2013) for examples of analyses of long-term debt. As the sample 
contains mainly unquoted firms, the ratio was calculated based on book values. The sample 
contains a large proportion of unlevered firms (34.2%), which are present in similar 
proportions in both family and non-family firms. 
 
3.2. Explanatory Variables 
 
All econometric models estimated in Section 4 include as control variables several factors 
that are expected to influence financial leverage decisions.  Size, measured by the natural 
logarithm of assets; Profitability, the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes and total 
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assets; Tangibility, the proportion of fixed assets in total assets; Growth, the yearly percentage 
change in total sales; Age, the number of years since the foundation of the firm; Liquidity, the 
sum of cash and marketable securities, divided by total assets; and eight industry dummies: 
Manufacturing Non Equipment; Manufacturing Equipment; Firm Services; Agriculture and 
Mining; Construction, Sales; Transportation; and Accommodation. Some of these variables 
are expected to have a positive impact on leverage ratios (Profitability, in the case of trade-off 
and agency costs theories; Growth, in pecking-order theory; Age, in agency costs theory; 
Liquidity, in trade-off theory; and Tangibility and Size, in all cases). Others are expected to 
have a negative effect (Growth, in trade-off and agency costs theories; Liquidity, in pecking-
order and agency costs theories; and Profitability and Age, in pecking-order theory). See inter 
alia Ramalho and Silva (2009) and the surveys by Prasade et al. (2005) and Frank and Goyal 
(2008) for a detailed explanation of all these possible effects. 
Given the focus of this paper, all estimated regression models also include the dummy 
variables Micro, Small, Metropolitan and 2009-2012, which equal one if the firm, 
respectively: can be classified as micro; can be classified as small; is located in a metropolitan 
area; is observed in the period 2009-2012.6 Otherwise, the value of each dummy variable is 
set to zero. In addition, some models also include the dummy variable Family and interactions 
between some dummy variables. 
Table 2 reports the average values of the continuous explanatory variables and the results 
of t tests for the significance of the differences between several pairs of groups. Reflecting the 
empirical hypotheses formulated in Section 2, we perform two types of comparisons. On the 
one hand, we compare family and non-family firm average values across several dimensions, 
using stars to denote significant differences. On the other hand, we test whether zero-leverage, 
firm size, geographical location and the 2008 crisis produce significant differences, denoted 
by x’s, in the average values of the control variables inside the group of family firms - we also 
report results for non-family firms and all firms.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
We find that most groups do not significantly differ in terms of profitability and growth, 
but differ systematically in terms of the other variables. Non-family firms have on average 
greater size and maturity, while family-owned firms present a higher level of liquidity and 
asset tangibility. Both family and non-family firms with zero-leverage ratios are smaller and 
older than the corresponding levered firms and have a smaller proportion of tangible assets 
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and greater liquidity. There are also significant differences between micro, small and large 
firms – larger firms have more tangible assets and are older and less liquid; across 
geographical locations - firms in metropolitan areas are larger, older and more liquid and have 
less tangible assets; and over time - after 2008, firms became less profitable, have a lower 
proportion of tangible assets and increased their size and liquidity. These differences across 
different groups of firms emphasise the importance of using regression analysis to study the 
effect of family ownership on capital structure choices. 
 
3.3. The Impact of Family Ownership and Other Factors on Financial Leverage: A 
Preliminary Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the mean leverage ratio and the percentage of zero-leverage firms for 
different groups of firms and the results of t tests for the significance of the differences 
between those ratios or percentages for several pairs of groups. The analysis relative to mean 
leverage ratios is performed both for the whole sample and the sub-sample of levered firms. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Considering overall mean leverage ratios, we find no significant differences between 
family (0.236) and non-family (0.237) firms. However, these values are the final result of two 
distinct decisions: whether to use debt and how much debt to use. Interestingly, when we 
analyse each decision separately, we find significant differences between family and non-
family firms: while non-family firms are significantly more prone to use debt - 66.9% versus 
64.7% - levered family firms use on average more debt than their non-family counterparts - 
0.366 versus 0.355. Similarly, when the analysis is restricted to specific sub-groups of family 
and non-family firms, the differences tend to be more relevant in the two-part scenario rather 
than in the overall case. Moreover, in general, the family ownership effect identified above 
seems to be valid for most sub-groups. The main exceptions are large firms, where the effect 
is opposite, and micro firms, where there are no significant differences between family and 
non-family businesses in both leverage decisions. Thus, this preliminary analysis supports 
Hypothesis 1, since the differences between family and non-family firms are significant in 
most cases, but not to Hypothesis 2, since the family ownership effect changes across size-
based groups and levered / unlevered firms. 
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For all firms, it appears there is a strong size effect. However, like the family ownership 
factor, the size effect is not uniform across capital structure decisions. A significantly higher 
proportion of smaller firms are unlevered (positive size effect); however, conditional on the 
use of debt, the greatest leverage ratios are displayed by small firms (negative size effect). 
Therefore, the results in Table 2 support Hypothesis 3. 
Regarding location, the differences between the leverage choices of firms in different 
geographical areas are significant in almost all cases. Family firms in metropolitan areas are 
significantly less prone to use debt but, when levered, exhibit higher mean leverage ratios 
than those located in other areas. Hence, Hypothesis 4 is also supported by these preliminary 
results. 
The 2008 financial crisis significantly changed the mean leverage and the propensity to 
use debt in all types of firms. In all cases, the mean leverage ratios increased after the 
beginning of the crisis, which is a direct consequence of the significantly higher proportion of 
firms that used debt in 2009-2012. Indeed, when unlevered firms are excluded, mean leverage 
ratios become significantly lower after 2008. Therefore, it seems that after 2008 a larger 
number of firms resorted to debt, but in relatively smaller amounts, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 5. 
We find that in all dimensions of this study, the effect of each factor on the probability of 
using debt is the opposite of the effect on the mean leverage ratios of levered firms. The 
propensity to use debt is significantly higher for family firms, large firms, non-metropolitan 
firms and after the 2008 crisis. Yet, a higher proportion of debt is used by non-family firms, 
smaller firms, metropolitan firms and before the 2008 crisis. These conflicting results support 
recent studies (Ramalho and Silva, 2009; Strebulaev and Yang, 2013) suggesting that it is 
important to consider separately the decisions on whether to use debt and, conditional on the 
use of debt, how much to use. 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
 
The relationships suggested by Table 3 may be due, at least partially, to other factors 
mentioned in the literature as being determinants of capital structure, such as the control 
variables described in Section 3.2. Moreover, we did not control simultaneously for firm size, 
firm location and the 2008 crisis. This section uses regression techniques to investigate 
whether, once all those factors are controlled for, the preliminary relationships discussed in 
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the previous section remain significant in explaining both the probability of a firm using debt 
and, conditional on the former decision, the amount of debt to use. 
 
4.1. Econometric Models 
 
We are interested in a discrete explanation of both the probability of a firm using debt and 
the relative amount of debt used by levered firms. Therefore, we use two different 
econometric models: for the former decision, binary choice models; for the latter decision, 
fractional regression models. In both cases, as we are mainly interested in the effects of 
mostly time-invariant dummy variables and we want to take into account the panel structure 
of the data, we consider only random-effects models. The other most common alternative 
panel data models either do not allow for time-constant explanatory variables (fixed-effects 
models) or do not allow for firm-specific effects, producing in general inconsistent estimators 
of regression coefficients in nonlinear models such as the binary models that we consider, 
even when those effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of the models (pooled 
models). 
Let y be the ratio of long-term debt to long-term capital assets, 0 ≤ y < 1, and z be a binary 
indicator that takes the values of unity and zero for levered and unlevered firms, respectively. 
Then: 
𝑧 = {
1  for  0 < 𝑦 < 1
0  for  𝑦 = 0        
 
Random-effects binary choice models for the probability of observing a levered firm are given 
by: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 1 | 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝛽) =  𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖),   𝛼𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼
2), 
where 𝐺(∙) is a distribution function, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables observed for 
firm 𝑖 in year t, 𝛽 is the vector of the parameters of interest and 𝜎𝛼
2 is the variance of the firm-
specific effects 𝛼𝑖, which are assumed to be normally distributed. This model is estimated by 
maximum likelihood. 
Fractional regression models were first proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and 
further developed by Ramalho et al. (2011) and, for the case of panel data, by Ramalho et al. 
(2017). These models are specific for responses bounded in the unit interval, such as the 
leverage ratio considered in this study. Unlike the linear regression model, fractional 
regression models guarantee that the predicted values of the dependent variable lie between 0 
and 1 and, thus, respect the proportional nature of leverage ratios. For some applications of 
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(cross-sectional) fractional regression models in the empirical capital structure literature, see 
Ramalho and Silva (2009, 2013) and Chauhan and Huseynov (2017). 
The random-effects model proposed by Ramalho et al. (2017) is given by: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 𝐺(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖), 
where 𝐺(∙) is some nonlinear function satisfying 0 < 𝐺(∙) < 1 and, as such, may have the 
same specification as in binary regression models. Unlike the binary case, there are no simple 
methods to estimate directly this model. However, because we use fractional regression 
models to explain the mean debt issued by levered firms, estimation is performed based only 
on the sub-sample of firms that use debt. Thus, no boundary values are observed for 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and, 
see Ramalho et al. (2017), the following linearized random-effects model may be estimated: 
𝐸[𝐻(𝑦𝑖𝑡)|𝑥𝑖𝑡] = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖, 
where 𝐻(∙) = 𝐺(∙)−1. 
There are several alternative specifications for 𝐺(∙) and hence, 𝐻(∙). As shown by 
Ramalho et al. (2011), the most distinct results are obtained when we contrast symmetric 
specifications (logit, probit) with asymmetric ones (loglog, complementary loglog). 
Therefore, for both binary and fractional regression models, two alternative model 
specifications were considered to assess the robustness of our results: a logit specification, 
where 𝐺(𝑤) =
𝑒𝑤
(1+𝑒𝑤)
 and, hence, 𝐻(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑦𝑖𝑡
1−𝑦𝑖𝑡
; and a cloglog specification, 
where 𝐺(𝑤) = 1 − 𝑒−𝑒
𝑤
 and, hence, 𝐻(𝑦𝑖𝑡) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔[−𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡)]. 
The suitability of each specification is assessed using a RESET test, which, in addition to 
being powerful against incorrect specification of 𝐺(𝑤) and 𝐻(𝑦𝑖𝑡), is able to detect a wide 
range of misspecifications, including omission of relevant (correlated or not with the included 
regressors) covariates. Thus, the RESET test also provides an indirect way of testing whether 
the unobserved firm-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables (fixed 
effects) or not (random effects) and is used instead of the more traditional Hausman test, 
which is not applicable in the binary panel data framework. See Ramalho and Ramalho (2012) 
for an analysis of the RESET test in the context of binary response models. 
To test the stability of the regression coefficients across two groups of firms, we used a 
Chow-type test. See Ramalho and Silva (2013, Appendix A) for details on the application of 
this test in the framework of this study. 
 
4.2. Empirical Results 
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4.2.1. General Findings 
 
Table 4 reports the results obtained for cloglog random effects binary and fractional 
regression models.7 In each case, we estimated four alternative models. Models (1) and (5) 
were estimated using the sub-sample of family firms, models (2) and (6) are based on the sub-
sample of non-family firms, and models (3)-(4) and (7)-(8) consider the whole sample, 
distinguishing between family and non-family firms by using only the dummy variable 
Family (models 3 and 7) or also their interactions with the other dummy variables (models 4 
and 8). The RESET test only rejects the null hypothesis of correct specification of the 
estimated models in one case, and only at the 10% significance level, which means we can be 
reasonably confident that sound econometric models, from a statistical point of view, are 
used. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Regarding the classical, continuous explanatory variables, the eight models make identical 
predictions for the sign and statistical significance of their effects on leverage in most cases, 
suggesting that pecking-order theory provides a reasonable explanation of the capital structure 
decisions of Portuguese firms. Indeed, the effects on leverage of the control variables Size 
(+), Tangibility (+), Age (-) and Liquidity (-) are consistent, in both binary and fractional 
models, with pecking-order theory. As informational asymmetries between managers and 
outside investors are typically less severe for larger firms, these firms generally have better 
access to the debt market (Myers, 1984). Firms with a larger proportion of tangible assets may 
find it easier to issue debt, since it is easier for the lender to establish the value of this kind of 
asset in informationally opaque firms (Ramalho and Silva, 2009). Assuming that firms prefer 
internal sources of finance, as pecking-order theory states, both older firms, which tend to 
accumulate retained earnings (Petersen and Rajan, 1994), and more liquid firms (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984) are expected to require less debt. Moreover, the findings relative to Growth and 
Profitability do not entirely corroborate pecking-order theory but do not contradict it: the 
predicted positive effect found for Growth is only significant for levered firms, while 
Profitability is relevant in only one of the eight models. 
 
4.2.2. Family Ownership Effect 
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Based on the regression coefficients estimated in models (1), (2), (5) and (6), it seems that 
most explanatory variables have similar effects, in terms of sign and significance, on family 
and non-family firm financial leverage. However, the null hypothesis of no significant 
differences between all regression coefficients is clearly rejected by the Chow test for both 
binary and fractional regression models. Thus, the joint impact of the explanatory variables on 
capital structure is different for family and non-family firms, which suggests there is indeed a 
family ownership influence on a firm’s debt leverage. Hence, a single regression model, not 
accounting for different ownership structures, would not describe in an appropriate way the 
capital structure choices of both family and non-family firms. 
To capture the general effect of family ownership, models (3) and (6) consider all firms, 
but add the Family dummy variable to the set of explanatory variables. The results show that 
family ownership has a significant, positive effect in both binary and fractional models. 
Therefore, on average, even after controlling for many of their observed differences, family 
firms tend to have significantly more debt than non-family firms: not only are family firms 
more prone to use debt, but levered family firms also have a higher proportion of debt in their 
capital structure. These findings, together with the results of the Chow tests, fully support 
Hypothesis 1. They also corroborate previous findings by inter alia King and Santor (2008) 
and Schmid (2013) about the positive effect of family ownership on a firm’s capital structure. 
Note that in the preliminary analysis carried out in Section 3.3, we found the opposite result 
that levered non-family firms use more debt than their family counterparts. This shows that 
not appropriately controlling for firm characteristics may substantially bias the conclusions 
and inform contradictory results found in earlier studies. 
The positive effect found for the family ownership factor provides support for theories 
that claim family firms have a capacity for higher leverage due to the greater continuity and 
stability of their organisational structure. This is implied by factors such as concern with 
family reputation and longer investment horizons and may lead to more favourable lending 
conditions; see inter alia Anderson at al. (2003) and Crespí and Martín-Oliver (2015). The 
more efficient management of resources that characterises many family firms (Andersen and 
Reeb, 2003a; Maury, 2006) is another factor that may explain the positive impact of family 
ownership on financial leverage. 
Models (3) and (6) assume that the effect of family ownership does not differ across sub-
groups of family and non-family firms. In models (4) and (8) we allow that effect to change 
across size-based groups, geographical location and time periods by adding interaction terms 
between those factors and Family. Examining the significance of the regression coefficients of 
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the new variables, and the result of the Wald test for their joint significance, we conclude that 
the family ownership effect is not uniform across groups. Regarding the probability of using 
debt, this effect is significantly lower than the average effect (0.284) in the case of micro and 
small firms and non-metropolitan areas. Considering only levered firms, the family ownership 
effect is again significantly lower than the average (0.157) for firms located in non-
metropolitan areas and it became significantly less important after the 2008 crisis. These 
findings are somewhat surprising, since most authors have suggested, directly or indirectly, a 
stronger family ownership effect for smaller, rural firms in the period 2009-2012. Indeed, 
family firms: are associated with small firms in the financial literature (Ramalho and Silva, 
2009; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003); have competitive advantages that are specific to rural areas 
(Bird and Wennberg, 2014; Backman and Palmberg, 2015); and seem to have been less 
affected by the 2008 crisis in terms of credit access (D’Aurizio et al., 2015; Crespí and 
Martín-Oliver, 2015). 
To further investigate the stability of the family ownership effect, Table 5 presents 
estimates for this effect for different sub-groups of family and non-family firms, which were 
calculated from the results of models (4) and (8).8 Note that the values reported for family and 
non-family firms are not interesting per se: a significant positive (negative) value would 
simply mean that the group in analysis uses more (less) debt, or is more (less) prone to use it, 
than the reference group - large non-family firms located in a non-metropolitan area and 
observed in the period 2006-2008 - implicitly considered in model (4). However, the 
difference between two of those values in cases where only ownership differs gives the family 
ownership effect for each sub-group of family and non-family firms. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 shows that the family ownership effect is significant and positive in eight of the 
12 groups in the binary case and in 10 of the 12 groups in the fractional case. We find that 
family firms located in metropolitan areas or of large size are always more prone to use, and 
use more debt, than their non-family counterparts. Before 2008, levered family firms of any 
type also tended to significantly use more debt, but, after the crisis, the effect, although still 
positive, is no longer significant for non-metropolitan micro and small firms. 
Our results reveal that the expected advantage of family firms in terms of access to 
funding in rural areas due to their stronger local roots (Bird and Wennberg, 2014; Backman 
and Palmberg, 2015) particularly applies to large firms. Smaller family firms, being less 
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influential, do not benefit more from relationship banking than their non-family counterparts, 
especially after 2008. The most likely reason for this change is that after 2008 in Portugal, 
many bank loan decisions previously made by officers at local bank branches, became 
centralised at offices located in metropolitan areas. Therefore, loan decisions are likely to 
have started to rely more on quantitative indicators and less on soft information such as local 
prestige.  
Overall, we conclude that Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported by the data. Indeed, 
while it is true that the effect of family ownership is significant and positive in most cases, it 
is also true that it differs across a range of sub-groups of family and non-family firms, being 
even irrelevant in a few cases. The fact that previous studies have focused on particular 
groups of firms is hence, likely to be another reason for the opposing results reported about 
the overall effect of family ownership. 
 
4.2.3. Size, Location and Crisis Effects for Zero-Leverage and Levered Family Firms 
 
We now focus on family firm leverage, namely on the influence of the factors mentioned 
in Hypotheses 3-5. To investigate this question thoroughly, we consider a very flexible model 
specification, where the effect of each factor is allowed to depend on all the others. This new 
specification adds to models (1) and (5) five interaction terms relating firm size, location and 
the 2008 crisis. The results obtained for the new models (9) and (10) are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
The estimates obtained for the classical, continuous explanatory variables in models (9) 
and (10) are very similar to those previously reported for models (1) and (5). The same does 
not happen for some of the dummy variables, suggesting that the effect of size, location and 
the 2008 crisis may be different for some sub-groups of family firms. In particular, note that 
the interaction terms involving the 2009-2012 variable are statistically significant in five of 
six cases. Therefore, as performed before for the family ownership effect, we computed the 
effect of each factor for all possible sub-groups of family firms using the results of Table 6. 
Again, note that the value reported for each group does not have a particularly interesting 
interpretation, since it merely provides a direct comparison with the reference group, which in 
this case concerns large family firms located in a non-metropolitan area and observed in the 
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period 2006-2008. What matters is the difference between each pair of groups that differ in 
only one dimension. 
Table 7 reports the estimates obtained for the size effect on family firm leverage. For the 
probability of using debt, there are no significant differences across micro, small and large 
firms, meaning that for family firms there is no size effect other than that captured by the 
continuous variable Size. On the other hand, concerning the amount of debt used by levered 
family firms, the clear negative size effect that was present before the crisis became 
insignificant in the period 2009-2012. This change may have occurred because smaller family 
firms were more affected by the reduction in credit supply after 2008 (Cowling et al., 2012; 
Vermoesen et al., 2013) and/or because large family firms also had to increase their demand 
for debt due to a poorer economic performance (Cowling et al., 2015) and the consequent 
increasing difficulty in generating internal funds or raising external equity. Overall, 
Hypothesis 3 does not seem to hold generally, but only for a particular debt decision and a 
specific period of time.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Relative to firm geographical location, see Table 8, we find that in general there is no 
location effect for the probability of family firms using debt. However, conditional on having 
debt, family firms in metropolitan areas tend to use it in significantly higher proportions. A 
simple explanation is that financing costs tend to be higher for firms located in non-
metropolitan areas (Arena and Dewally, 2012; Degryse and Ongena, 2005), so they use 
relatively lower amounts of debt. Because the proportion of metropolitan and non-
metropolitan firms using debt is not significantly different, our results also suggest that firms 
located outside metropolitan areas nevertheless benefit from relationship banking to access 
debt, although in smaller amounts. Overall, Hypothesis 4 is partially supported by our results. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Finally, consider Table 9, which reports the estimated crisis effects for family firm 
leverage. Unlike the previous cases, there is strong evidence that the 2008 global crisis 
affected the capital structure of family firms significantly. The crisis led to increased 
probability of any type of family firm using debt, as formulated in the first part of Hypothesis 
5. They are now more prone to issue debt, probably because after 2008, fewer internal 
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resources were generated as a direct consequence of the economic crisis that damaged firm 
performance (Cowling et al., 2015).  The proportion of debt held by levered family firms has 
also changed significantly. However, while the debt ratios of micro and small levered family 
firms were negatively affected by the global crisis, especially the former, large firms actually 
increased their debt. This confirms our previous interpretation that the irrelevant firm size 
effect found above for the period after 2008 was indeed a consequence of both demand and 
supply factors. Overall, Hypothesis 5 is fully supported by our results. 
 
Table 9 about here 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we analysed the effect of family ownership on firm leverage across 
different sub-groups of family and non-family firms. We also investigated the influence of 
firm size, geographical location and the 2008 financial crisis on the capital structure of family 
firms. We found that family ownership influences positively both the probability of using 
long-term debt and the conditional amount of debt issued by large firms and firms located in 
metropolitan areas. For other types of firms, the first effect is irrelevant and the second 
disappeared after 2008. Indeed, the 2008 crisis seems to have had a significant impact on 
family firm debt policy. All types of family firms became significantly more prone to use 
debt; however, the proportion of debt decreased for micro and small firms, but increased for 
large firms. Finally, the direct effects of size and location on family firm leverage seem to be 
irrelevant for the probability of using debt. However, metropolitan levered firms, throughout 
the whole period, and smaller levered firms, before the crisis, use more debt. Classical 
determinants of capital structure are also relevant and we found that their effects conform to 
some extent with pecking-order theory. 
As previously documented, for firms of any type of ownership (Cowling et al., 2012; 
Vermoesen et al., 2013; Dang et al., 2014; Van Hoang et al., 2017), we found that smaller 
family firms were more affected by the reduction in credit supply after 2008. In addition, we 
found other important consequences of the 2008 financial crisis, namely a demand-side effect. 
Indeed, the most probable reason for the higher proportion of firms that use debt in the period 
2009-2012 is increasing demand, which may be due to the economic crisis and the consequent 
reduction in retained earnings or, to the increasing difficulties in raising external equity. These 
results have important implications for policy makers, suggesting that mechanisms to grant 
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access to debt during crisis periods should be targeted at micro and small firms. For large 
firms, it would be potentially more useful to focus on measures aimed at improving their 
access to external equity and the functioning of stock markets, promoting better corporate 
governance practices adapted to the expectations of external investors who require assurance 
with respect to the quality of issues during crisis periods. 
The finding that family firms in metropolitan areas use more debt than those located in 
less densely populated areas, together with the finding that the probability of using debt is 
similar in both areas, reveals that relationship banking is important in improving access to 
debt but has not been enough to counterbalance the cost disadvantage of rural firms. These 
results show that a stronger presence of local banking market structures, and the likely 
increased use of better soft information on firms, would be important in reducing financing 
gaps in non-metropolitan areas.  Unfortunately, the banking crisis that still affects Portugal 
and has recently led to a reduction of bank branches, especially in small towns and rural areas, 
is likely to have the opposite effect and hinder access to debt by firms located in these 
regions.  
This study has several limitations and, as such, provides several avenues for future 
research. First, we treated family firms as a homogeneous entity, using a binary variable to 
differentiate between family and non-family firms. However, family firms display some 
degree of heterogeneity, as the difficulties in agreeing upon a definition illustrate (Chua et al., 
2012). Therefore, recent studies have started to use either separate binary variables to 
distinguish between different aspects of family firms or even continuous measures of family 
involvement. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate whether our results hold when other 
definitions of family firm are used. 
It would also be interesting to include in the leverage regression analysis of family firms 
variables representing personal characteristics of the owner, such as age, gender, level of 
education and goals, especially in the case of smaller firms, where often the owner is 
simultaneously, the manager of the firm. However, such data is usually difficult to collect. 
Another limitation is that we considered the case of a single country. While we think that 
Portugal represents an ideal laboratory for our analysis, at least concerning the crisis effects 
(the sovereign risk of the country and the banking crisis greatly reduced the supply of credit 
and increased interest rates), it is important to provide evidence on the validity of our results 
for other countries. Similarly, we focussed on a specific measure of leverage: long-term debt. 
It would be interesting to repeat this analysis for other types of debt and financing sources.  
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Finally, concerning the econometric methodology, some issues deserve further 
investigation and are likely to require the use of other techniques. For example, we explained 
some findings using both demand- and supply-side arguments, but the methodology applied 
in the article does not allow quantification of their separate effects on firm leverage. Another 
question is that we assumed that the decisions on whether to use debt, and how much, are 
independent upon one another. However, there may be unobserved factors that influence both 
decisions, which suggest Heckman-type selection models may be a useful alternative in this 
context. A related issue is the potential endogeneity of some variables, such as Family, since 
there may also be unobserved factors that simultaneously influence family ownership and 
leverage. Although the RESET tests applied show this is not a problem in our analysis, 
similar empirical studies in other settings may require the use of econometric methods 
explicitly accounting for endogenous covariates. 
                                                 
1 For a summary of the most common definitions, see Chrisman et al. (2005) and Sharma (2004). 
2 For a review of other research topics in family business studies, see inter alia Sharma (2004) and Smyrnios et 
al. (2014). 
3 SABI – Analysis System of Iberian Balance Sheets – is the largest database of financial information about 
Portuguese firms and is produced by Bureau Van Dijk and managed by Informa, S.A. and BvD. 
4 Note that the European Commission’s criteria also distinguish between medium and large firms, but here, to 
simplify the econometric analysis and without a substantial loss of generality, we included all those firms in the 
group of large firms. Indeed, preliminary experiments run by us suggested that separating medium and large 
firms into two distinct groups would not change the main conclusions of the paper. Moreover, in a previous 
study based on a sample of Portuguese firms, Ramalho and Silva (2009) also found no significant differences 
between medium and large firms’ financing decisions. 
5 For example, Flannery and Rangan (2006) find that US firms adjust at a rate of 34% per year and Antoniou et 
al. (2008) estimated adjustment speeds between 32% (US and UK) and 39% (France). 
6 Note that size is included in two different ways in the analysis, both as a quantitative variable (assets) and as a 
nominal variable (size-based group of firms), since it is assumed that the effects of firm size may vary depending 
on whether the firm is in fact micro, small or large sized. 
7 Similar results, which are available upon request, were obtained considering a logit specification. 
8 To understand how the values in Table 5 were calculated, consider the first row, which measures the effect of 
family ownership for micro firms located in a metropolitan area for the period before the financial crisis. 
Focusing on the binary case, the value reported for family firms (0.024) is obtained by summing up the 
coefficients of the variables Family, Micro, Metropolitan, Family * Micro and Family * Metropolitan of model 
(4) in Table 4; for non-family firms (-0.291), we only sum up the coefficients of Micro and Metropolitan. The 
family ownership effect is simply the difference between the two values (0.315). 
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Table 1 – Sample 
 Family firms  Non-family firms  Total 
 # %  # %  # % 
By leverage:         
   Zero-leverage firms 11 744 35.3  10 351 33.1  22 095 34.2 
   Levered firms 21 520 64.7  20 925 66.9  42 445 65.8 
By size:         
   Micro firms 3 565 10.7  2 393 7.7  5 958 9.2 
   Small firms 25 725 77.3  20 494 65.5  46 219 71.6 
   Large firms 3 974 12.0  8 389 26.8  12 363 19.2 
By location:         
   Metropolitan area 12 250 36.8  12 768 40.8  25 018 38.8 
   Other areas 21 014 63.2  18 508 59.2  39 522 61.2 
By period:         
   2006-2008 14 256 42.9  13 404 42.9  27 660 42.9 
   2009-2012 19 008 57.1  17 872 57.1  36 880 57.1 
Total 33 264 100.0  31 276 100.0  64 540 100.0 
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Table 2 – Sample means for the non-dummy explanatory variables 
 Family firms Non-family firms Total 
Size 
By leverage: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Zero-leverage firms 13.773*** 14.417*** 14.075 
   Levered firms 14.315*** 14.940*** 14.623 
By size: (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 13.275*** 13.380*** 13.317 
   Small firms 14.017*** 14.310*** 14.147 
   Large firms 15.580*** 16.277*** 16.053 
By location: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 14.090*** 14.917*** 14.512 
   Other areas 14.144*** 14.663*** 14.387 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 14.051*** 14.697*** 14.364 
   2009-2012 14.178*** 14.819*** 14.489 
Total 14.124*** 14.767*** 14.435 
Profitability 
By leverage:    
   Zero-leverage firms 0.026 0.029 0.027 
   Levered firms -0.022 0.022 0.000 
By size:  (-,x,x)  
   Micro firms 0.057* -0.124* -0.016 
   Small firms -0.021 0.031 0.002 
   Large firms 0.041*** 0.051*** 0.047 
By location:  (x)  
   Metropolitan area 0.030** 0.043** 0.036 
   Other areas -0.025 0.012 -0.008 
By period:  (x) (x) 
   2006-2008 0.044 0.045 0.045 
   2009-2012 -0.042 0.009 -0.017 
Total -0.005 0.024 0.009 
Tangibility 
By leverage: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Zero-leverage firms 0.234*** 0.207*** 0.221 
   Levered firms 0.284 0.287 0.285 
By size: (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,-,xxx) (x,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 0.246*** 0.269*** 0.256 
   Small firms 0.267*** 0.254*** 0.261 
   Large firms 0.284** 0.274** 0.277 
By location: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 0.250*** 0.228*** 0.239 
   Other areas 0.276*** 0.283*** 0.279 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 0.275* 0.271* 0.273 
   2009-2012 0.260*** 0.252*** 0.256 
Total 0.266*** 0.260*** 0.264 
(continues) 
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Table 2 – continued 
 Family firms Non-family firms Total 
Growth 
By leverage:    
   Zero-leverage firms 0.084 0.144 0.112 
   Levered firms 0.073 0.357 0.213 
By size:    
   Micro firms 0.148 0.305 0.211 
   Small firms 0.071 0.111 0.089 
   Large firms 0.055 0.710 0.499 
By location:    
   Metropolitan area 0.063 0.535 0.304 
   Other areas 0.085 0.116 0.099 
By period: (xxx)   
   2006-2008 0.131 0.607 0.362 
   2009-2012 0.036 0.047 0.041 
Total 0.077 0.287 0.179 
Age 
By leverage: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Zero-leverage firms 22.246*** 24.954*** 23.515 
   Levered firms 21.849*** 24.104*** 22.960 
By size: (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 17.219*** 19.402*** 18.096 
   Small firms 21.879*** 23.170*** 22.452 
   Large firms 26.978*** 28.775*** 28.197 
By location: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 23.861*** 25.912*** 24.908 
   Other areas 20.898*** 23.332*** 22.038 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 19.989*** 22.385*** 21.150 
   2009-2012 23.489*** 25.885*** 24.650 
Total 21.989*** 24.385*** 23.150 
Liquidity 
By leverage: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Zero-leverage firms 0.146*** 0.137*** 0.142 
   Levered firms 0.084*** 0.071*** 0.078 
By size: (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 0.117 0.113 0.115 
   Small firms 0.108*** 0.098*** 0.104 
   Large firms 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.078 
By location: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.108 
   Other areas 0.100*** 0.087*** 0.094 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.095 
   2009-2012 0.109*** 0.096*** 0.103 
Total 0.106*** 0.093*** 0.100 
Note: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote cases where the means or percentages for family firms for a given leverage, size, 
location or period category are significantly different from the corresponding quantities for non-family firms 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. ‘xxx’, ‘xx’ and ‘x’, in parentheses, denote cases where the means 
or percentages for firms in a leverage, size, location or period category are significantly different from the 
corresponding quantities for a related category at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In the case of size, 
which comprises three categories, there are three figures between parentheses: the first is relative to the 
comparison of micro and small firms, the second refers to micro and large firms and the third to small and 
large firms; in this case, we use ‘-’ to denote differences between two size-based groups that are not 
significant. 
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Table 3 – Leverage 
 Family firms Non-family firms Total 
Mean leverage ratios – both levered and zero-leverage firms 
By size: (-,xxx,xxx) (-,xxx,xxx) (-,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 0.235 0.227 0.232 
   Small firms 0.232 0.232 0.232 
   Large firms 0.265*** 0.253*** 0.257 
By location: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 0.230*** 0.219*** 0.224 
   Other areas 0.240*** 0.250*** 0.245 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 0.227 0.228 0.227 
   2009-2012 0.243 0.245 0.244 
Total 0.236 0.237 0.237 
Mean leverage ratios – only levered firms 
By size: (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 0.417 0.403 0.411 
   Small firms 0.367*** 0.357*** 0.362 
   Large firms 0.328** 0.339** 0.335 
By location: (xxx)  (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 0.373*** 0.356*** 0.364 
   Other areas 0.362*** 0.354*** 0.358 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 0.382*** 0.363*** 0.372 
   2009-2012 0.355* 0.350* 0.352 
Total 0.366*** 0.355*** 0.360 
Percentage of zero-leverage firms 
By size: (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) (xxx,xxx,xxx) 
   Micro firms 43.7 43.5 43.7 
   Small firms 36.6*** 35.0*** 35.9 
   Large firms 19.2*** 25.5*** 23.5 
By location: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   Metropolitan area 38.3 38.5 38.4 
   Other areas 33.6*** 29.4*** 31.6 
By period: (xxx) (xxx) (xxx) 
   2006-2008 40.5*** 37.2*** 38.9 
   2009-2012 31.4*** 30.0*** 30.7 
Total 35.3*** 33.1*** 34.2 
Note: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote cases where the means or percentages for family firms for a given size, location 
or period category are significantly different from the corresponding quantities for non-family firms at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. ‘xxx’, ‘xx’ and ‘x’, in parentheses, denote cases where the means or 
percentages for firms in a size, location or period category are significantly different from the corresponding 
quantities for a related category at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In the case of size, which 
comprises three categories, there are three figures between parentheses: the first is relative to the comparison 
of micro and small firms, the second refers to micro and large firms and the third to small and large firms; in 
this case, we use ‘-’ to denote differences between two size-based groups that are not significant. 
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Table 4 – Random effects binary and fractional regression models 
Variable 
Binary models  Fractional models 
Family 
firms 
Non-family 
firms 
All firms  
Family 
firms 
Non-family 
firms 
All firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size 0.632*** 0.479*** 0.532*** 0.541***  0.103*** 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) 
Profitability 0.000 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005  -0.000 -0.005*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility 1.384*** 1.776*** 1.601*** 1.590***  1.174*** 0.981*** 1.066*** 1.068*** 
 (0.137) (0.156) (0.103) (0.103)  (0.084) (0.089) (0.063) (0.063) 
Growth -0.004* 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010***  -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Liquidity -1.687*** -1.802*** -1.731*** -1.734***  -0.956*** -1.067*** -1.012*** -1.013*** 
 (0.163) (0.193) (0.125) (0.125)  (0.119) (0.145) (0.093) (0.093) 
Micro -0.017 0.102 0.085 0.234***  0.167*** 0.167*** 0.173*** 0.198*** 
 (0.092) (0.097) (0.066) (0.090)  (0.049) (0.056) (0.037) (0.053) 
Small -0.069 0.138* 0.078 0.243***  0.056 0.086** 0.077*** 0.109*** 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.052) (0.066)  (0.040) (0.041) (0.029) (0.039) 
Metropolitan -0.114** -0.519*** -0.320*** -0.525***  0.123*** -0.024 0.049* -0.023 
 (0.056) (0.067) (0.043) (0.063)  (0.034) (0.041) (0.026) (0.041) 
2009-2012 0.465*** 0.458*** 0.462*** 0.441***  -0.023 0.025 0.001 0.025 
 (0.029) (0.033) (0.022) (0.032)  (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) 
Family   0.117*** 0.284***    0.120*** 0.157*** 
   (0.042) (0.099)    (0.025) (0.053) 
Family * Micro    -0.379***     -0.063 
    (0.120)     (0.067) 
Family * Small    -0.411***     -0.075 
    (0.094)     (0.051) 
Family * Metropolitan    0.410***     0.142*** 
    (0.084)     (0.053) 
Family * 2009-2012    0.039     -0.047** 
    (0.043)     (0.024) 
RESET test 2.45 3.48* 1.60 0.41  1.59 0.46 0.04 0.03 
Chow test 99.66***    75.63***   
Wald test for Family interactions    42.13***     13.16** 
Number of observations 33 264 31 276 64 540 64 540  21 520 20 925 42 445 42 445 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote regression coefficients and test statistics which are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; all models include industry dummies and an intercept 
term; the results of the Chow tests are based on the comparison of models (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (5) and (6), on the other hand. 
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Table 5 – Family ownership effects 
Firm 
Size 
Geographical 
Location 
Time 
Period 
Binary models  Fractional models 
Family 
firms 
Non-family 
firms 
Difference 
(effect) 
 Family 
firms 
Non-family 
firms 
Difference 
(effect) 
Micro Metropolitan area 2006-2008 0.024 -0.291 0.315***  0.411 0.175 0.236*** 
     (0.101)    (0.061) 
  2009-2012 0.504 0.150 0.354***  0.388 0.199 0.189*** 
     (0.102)    (0.061) 
 Other areas 2006-2008 0.139 0.234 -0.095  0.292 0.198 0.094* 
     (0.091)    (0.055) 
  2009-2012 0.619 0.675 -0.056  0.269 0.222 0.047 
     (0.092)    (0.055) 
Small Metropolitan area 2006-2008 0.000 -0.282 0.283***  0.310 0.086 0.224*** 
     (0.073)    (0.047) 
  2009-2012 0.480 0.159 0.322***  0.287 0.111 0.177*** 
     (0.072)    (0.045) 
 Other areas 2006-2008 0.115 0.243 -0.128**  0.191 0.109 0.082** 
     (0.060)    (0.036) 
  2009-2012 0.595 0.684 -0.089  0.168 0.134 0.035 
     (0.058)    (0.034) 
Large Metropolitan area 2006-2008 0.169 -0.525 0.694***  0.276 -0.023 0.299*** 
     (0.109)    (0.063) 
  2009-2012 0.649 -0.084 0.733***  0.253 0.002 0.251*** 
     (0.109)    (0.062) 
 Other areas 2006-2008 0.284 0.000 0.284***  0.157 0.000 0.157*** 
     (0.099)    (0.053) 
  2009-2012 0.763 0.441 0.323***  0.134 0.025 0.110** 
     (0.098)    (0.052) 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote differences which are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; all calculations are based on models (4) and (8). 
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Table 6 – Random effects binary and fractional regression 
models for family firms 
Variable 
Binary Fractional 
(9) (10) 
Size 0.631*** 0.101*** 
 (0.031) (0.018) 
Profitability 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Tangibility 1.394*** 1.180*** 
 (0.137) (0.084) 
Growth -0.004* 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Age -0.012*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Liquidity -1.673*** -0.971*** 
 (0.163) (0.118) 
Micro -0.100 0.312** 
 (0.127) (0.073) 
Small -0.088 0.132** 
 (0.102) (0.056) 
Metropolitan 0.054 0.125 
 (0.148) (0.076) 
2009-2012 0.414*** 0.139*** 
 (0.095) (0.042) 
Micro * Metropolitan -0.082 0.050 
 (0.175) (0.094) 
Micro * 2009-2012 0.208* -0.284*** 
 (0.123) (0.064) 
Small * Metropolitan -0.100 0.038 
 (0.146) (0.074) 
Small * 2009-2012 0.101 -0.152*** 
 (0.097) (0.044) 
Metropolitan * 2009-2012 -0.144** -0.061* 
 (0.060) (0.034) 
RESET test 2.48 0.43 
Number of observations 33 264 21 520 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote regression coefficients and test statistics which are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; all models include industry dummies and an 
intercept term. 
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Table 7 – Size effects in family firms 
Geographical 
location 
Time 
Period 
Estimates  Differences (effects) 
Micro firms Small firms Large firms 
 Micro vs 
Small firms 
Micro vs 
Large firms 
Small vs 
Large firms 
Binary regression models 
Metropolitan area 2006-2008 -0.128 -0.134 0.054  0.005 -0.182 -0.188 
      (0.099) (0.161) (0.130) 
 2009-2012 0.349 0.237 0.324  0.112 0.026 -0.0.86 
      (0.091) (0.155) (0.128) 
Other area 2006-2008 -0.100 -0.088 0.000  -0.012 -0.100 -0.088 
      (0.080) (0.127) (0.102) 
 2009-2012 0.523 0.428 0.414  0.094 0.108 0.014 
      (0.074) (0.127) (0.105) 
Fractional regression models 
Metropolitan area 2006-2008 0.487 0.295 0.125  0.192*** 0.362*** 0.171*** 
      (0.060) (0.087) (0.066) 
 2009-2012 0.282 0.221 0.203  0.061 0.079 0.018 
      (0.058) (0.084) (0.062) 
Other area 2006-2008 0.312 0.132 0.000  0.180*** 0.312*** 0.132** 
      (0.048) (0.073) (0.056) 
 2009-2012 0.168 0.119 0.139  0.049 0.029 -0.020 
      (0.038) (0.063) (0.051) 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote differences which are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; all calculations are based on models (9) and (10). 
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Table 8 – Geographical location effects in family firms 
Firm 
Size 
Time 
Period 
Binary models  Fractional models 
Metropolitan 
area 
Other 
areas 
Difference 
(effect) 
 Metropolitan 
area 
Other 
areas 
Difference 
(effect) 
Micro 2006-2008 -0.128 -0.100 -0.029  0.487 0.312 0.175*** 
    (0.113)    (0.067) 
 2009-2012 0.349 0.523 -0.173  0.282 0.168 0.114* 
    (0.113)    (0.068) 
Small 2006-2008 -0.134 -0.088 -0.046  0.295 0.132 0.163*** 
    (0.068)    (0.042) 
 2009-2012 0.237 0.428 -0.191***  0.221 0.119 0.103*** 
    (0.064)    (0.038) 
Large 2006-2008 0.054 0.000 0.054  0.125 0.000 0.125* 
    (0.148)    (0.076) 
 2009-2012 0.324 0.414 -0.091  0.203 0.139 0.064 
    (0.146)    (0.073) 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote differences which are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; all calculations are based on 
models (9) and (10). 
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Table 9 – Crisis effects in family firms 
Firm 
Size 
Geographical 
Location 
Binary models  Fractional models 
2006-2008 2009-2012 
Difference 
(effect) 
 2006-2008 2009-2012 
Difference 
(effect) 
Micro Metropolitan area -0.046 0.432 0.478***  0.437 0.232 -0.205*** 
    (0.091)    (0.056) 
 Other area -0.100 0.523 0.622***  0.312 0.168 -0.145*** 
    (0.085)    (0.052) 
Small Metropolitan area -0.034 0.337 0.371***  0.257 0.183 -0.074*** 
    (0.049)    (0.029) 
 Other area -0.088 0.428 0.516***  0.132 0.119 -0.013 
    (0.039)    (0.023) 
Large Metropolitan area 0.054 0.324 0.270***  0.125 0.203 0.078* 
    (0.099)    (0.045) 
 Other area 0.000 0.414 0.414***  0.000 0.139 0.139*** 
    (0.095)    (0.042) 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote differences which are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%; all calculations are based on models (9) and 
(10). 
 
